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Abstract
We describe some properties of consistent sets of histories in the Gell-Mann–Hartle
formalism, and give an example to illustrate that one cannot recover the standard predic-
tions, retrodictions and inferences of quasiclassical physics using the criterion of consistency
alone.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Bz
1. Introduction
Standard quantum theory, in the Copenhagen interpretation,1 gives a robust and
successful algorithm for predicting the results of laboratory experiments. It has, however,
nothing to say about the larger quantum universe outside the lab, since its subject is solely
the results of measurements made by some classical measuring apparatus whose existence
is taken as an a priori assumption. New theories which make predictions without this last
assumption would be of great interest, since they would have greater predictive power.
The consistent histories approach of Griffiths, Omne`s, Gell-Mann and Hartle has been
suggested to be just such a development, extending the Copenhagen interpretation [2,3,4,5]
1 For definiteness consider the version of the Copenhagen interpretation set out by Landau
and Lifschitz [1].
and allowing us to make predictions in quantum cosmology where the quantum system is
the whole universe [6,7,8]. It is a formalism from which, it is hoped, the largely classical
world of our experience might be deduced, rather than assumed. Thus, our observations
of large-scale classical structure in the universe, of macroscopic objects following classical
equations of motion, and of definite classical outcomes to quantum experiments, are all sup-
posed to be predictions, unconditionally derivable from the formalism. If these hopes were
to be realised, the consistent histories approach would indeed have provided a significant
increase in our predictive power. They rest, however, on as yet incomplete interpretational
arguments and have naturally led to much debate [9,10]. Our own arguments, together
with a critique of the existing literature, will be given in detail elsewhere [11]. Our aim
here is to draw attention to some perhaps counter-intuitive properties of consistent sets of
histories, most of which have not previously been discussed in any detail in the consistent
histories literature, and to explain their physical relevance.
2. The Consistent Histories Formalism
We begin with a brief description of the consistent histories formalism as it applies
to non-relativistic quantum mechanics, in the Heisenberg picture, using the language of
projection operators and density matrices. We assume that a Hilbert space, H, and hamil-
tonian, H, are given, that hermitian operators correspond to observables, that the commu-
tation relations amongst the hamiltonian and physically interesting observables (such as
position, momentum and spin) have been specified, and that the operators corresponding
to the same observables at different times are related by
P (t) = exp(iHt/h¯)P (0) exp(−iHt/h¯) . (2.1)
We are interested in a system (in principle, the universe) whose initial density matrix
ρi is given. We require that ρi is positive semi-definite. The formalism also allows a
final condition to be imposed, an interesting generalisation of standard quantum theory,
though we shall not consider that possibility explicitly here. The basic physical events we
are interested in correspond to sets σ of orthogonal hermitian projections P (i), with
∑
i
P (i) = 1 and P (i)P (j) = δijP
(i). (2.2)
These projective decompositions of the identity are applied at definite times, which we
append to the sets of projections: thus σj(tj) = {P (i)j ; i = 1, 2, . . . , nj}tj . defines a set of
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projections obeying (2.2) and applied at time tj . However, since our results depend only on
the time ordering, we will generally omit explicit time labels. Suppose now we have a list of
sets σj(tj) of this form, with j running from 1 to n, at times tj with ti < t1 < . . . < tn < tf .
Then the histories given by choosing one projection from each σj in all possible ways are an
exhaustive and exclusive set of alternatives, S. We use Gell-Mann and Hartle’s decoherence
condition, and say that the histories form a consistent set if
Tr(P (in)n . . . P
(i1)
1 ρiP
(j1)
1 . . . P
(jn)
n ) = δi1j1 . . . δinjnp(i1 . . . in) , (2.3)
in which case p(i1 . . . in) is the probability of the history P
(i1)
1 . . . P
(in)
n . (Gell-Mann and
Hartle term a set satisfying (2.3) medium decoherent.)
We say the set
S′ = (ρi, {σ1, . . . , σk, τ, σk+1, . . . , σn}) (2.4)
is a consistent extension of a consistent set of histories S = (ρi, {σ1, . . . , σn}) by the set of
projections τ = {Qi : i = 1, . . . , m} if τ satisfies (2.2) and S′ is itself consistent. We say the
consistent extension S′ is trivial if, for each history {P (i1)1 , . . . , P (ik)k , P (ik+1)k+1 , . . . , P (in)n } in
S, at most one of the extended histories {P (i1)1 , . . . , P (ik)k , Qi, P (ik+1)k+1 , . . . , P (in)n } has non-
zero probability. We extend these definitions by taking consistent extension and trivial
consistent extension to be transitive relations.
3. Counting consistent sets
Let us now take the Hilbert space, H, to be of finite dimension N and ask: just how
many consistent sets are there? We first describe how consistent sets may be classified. The
basic objects in the formalism are the projective decompositions of the identity σj = {P (i)j :
i = 1, 2, . . . , nj}, where the P (i)j satisfy (2.2). These decompositions are parametrised by
the set of ranks {r(1)j , r(2)j , . . . , r(nj)j } of the projection operators, where N =
∑nj
i=1 r
(i)
j and
we take r
(1)
j ≥ r(2)j ≥ . . . ≥ r(nj)j , and the manifold:
G(N ; r
(1)
j , r
(2)
j , . . . , r
(nj)
j ) =
U(N)
(U(r
(1)
j )× U(r(2)j )× . . .× U(r(nj)j ))× J
. (3.1)
J is a discrete symmetry group that eliminates overcounting when some of the ranks are
equal.
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The parameter space of a set of histories is then a manifold, M , which is a product
of such G’s, one for each projective decomposition, σk, k = 1, 2, . . . , n (i.e. one for each
time, tk): M = G1 × . . .×Gn.
It is easy to use this parametrisation in explicit calculations: one can define projections
{P (1), . . . , P (nj)} of ranks {r(1), r(2), . . . , r(nj)} by choosing an orthonormal basis of vectors
{x1, . . . , xn}, so that
P (1) =
r1∑
i=1
xi(xi)
† , P (2) =
r1+r2∑
i=r1+1
xi(xi)
† , (3.2)
and so on. The redundancies in this parametrisation correspond to the actions of the
quotient subgroups, and can be eliminated at any convenient point. This can be done for
each time. Thus, in principle, we can simply fix the form of the initial density matrix, fix
the ranks of the projection operators in the type of consistent set we wish to classify, and
then impose the consistency conditions (2.3). These will be algebraic equations defining a
submanifold, L, the submanifold of consistent sets, of the manifold of all sets of histories,
M .
While these algebraic equations are generally very complicated, one can at least make
educated guesses at the qualitative features of L, such as its dimension, and these guesses
can be checked in simple examples. A typical physical illustration of the consistent histories
formalism would involve a small number of projection operators, describing quasiclassical
operators in a large Hilbert space. One might, for instance, describe a coarse-grained
trajectory of a dust grain, interacting with a photon background. Such physical projection
operators rarely form a precisely consistent set, and there has been debate over whether or
not it is possible to find close approximations to the projection operators which are exactly
consistent. Comparing the number of parameters used to specify sets inM (very large) with
the number of consistency equations (rather small) suggests that this is generically possible.
If so, there is no need to follow Gell-Mann and Hartle in ascribing a fundamental role to
approximately consistent sets: exactly consistent sets suffice. Moreover, the counting
arguments show that in any physically realistic situation the dimension of L, the space of
consistent sets, is very large.
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4. Properties of Consistent Sets
So, let us suppose that physics is described by exactly consistent sets and look at what
this implies. We omit proofs, which can be found in Ref. [11].
Lemma 1 2 Let S = (ρ, {σ1, . . . , σk}) be a consistent set which is not a trivial extension
of any consistent subset, defined on a space H of dimension N , with initial density matrix
ρ of rank r. Then the length k of S obeys k ≤ rN . (In particular, if ρ is pure then k ≤ N .)
In other words, if the Hilbert space of the universe is finite-dimensional there is a strict
bound on the number of probabilistic physical events. Once this number has occurred, the
evolution of the universe continues completely deterministically. This is mathematically
an unsurprising feature of the formalism but, as far as we are aware, physically quite new:
no previous interpretation of quantum theory has suggested that quantum stochasticity is
exhaustible in this way.
In the consistent histories approach, predictions can only be made once a consistent set
— the physically relevant set — is fixed. The key problem in interpreting the formalism is
explaining how, given the profligate abundance of consistent sets, this is to be done. Once
the choice has been made, one can simply declare by fiat that physics should be described
by one history from the relevant set, chosen at random using the decoherence functional
probability distribution. Again, the key question is whether the choice has been made
within the formalism or whether it relies on assumptions that go beyond it.
It thus becomes an important question whether, when some of the projective decom-
positions in the relevant set are known, others can be determined. In particular, if, taking
the past and present for granted, we were able to deduce the form of the relevant set in
the future using only consistency criteria then we could indeed make unconditional predic-
tions about the future within the consistent histories formalism: the choice of set would
be clearly determined by the formalism. This, though, is generally false:
Lemma 2 Let S be a set of consistent histories for which there exists a non-trivial
consistent extension. Let S have a pure initial state ρ, and letH be either finite-dimensional
or separable. Then there exists a continuous family of non-trivial extensions for each
history in S with non-zero probability.
So, if a consistent set describing a physical system up to time t leaves some future events
unpredictable, there are infinitely many different consistent continuations of that set. In
2 A similar result has been obtained independently by Dio´si [12].
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particular, if a consistent set describes, in Gell-Mann and Hartle’s language, quasiclassical
physics — involving operators describing the same types of variables at different times,
following largely deterministic evolution equations — up to time t then, if any unpre-
dictability remains, almost all future consistent continuations will not be quasiclassical.
Whatever our experience of a persistently quasiclassical world may be ascribed to — and
there are various suggestions [11] — it does not follow simply from consistency.
Still, one might hope that at least, if the set up to time t is quasiclassical, then any non-
quasiclassical consistent future extension can consistently incorporate future deterministic
quasiclassical predictions. Indeed, Omne`s has suggested that this is so [5]. But in fact, as
Omne`s now accepts, this fails quite generally. If unpredictability remains, then there are
no future predictions consistent with all consistent extensions of the present data:
Lemma 3 Let S = (|ψ〉〈ψ|, {σ1, . . . , σl}) be as in Lemma 2, with H finite-dimensional
or separable. Then there is no projective decomposition σl+1 such that:
(i) S′ = (ρ, {σ1, . . . , σl, σl+1}) is a consistent extension of S
and (ii) any consistent extension S′′ = (ρ, {σ1, . . . , σl, τ1, . . . , τr}) of S has a consistent
extension (ρ, {σ1, . . . , σl, τ1, . . . , τr, σl+1}).
We have only been able to identify one class of statements which can consistently be
added to any consistent extension of a set. These arise where the set contains the same
decomposition twice. In this case, further repetitions can be included, provided that they
are made between the first two:
Lemma 4 Let S = (ρ, {s1, . . . , sj, t, t1, . . . , tl, t, sj+1, . . . , sk}) ≡ (ρ, {S1, t, T, t, S2})
be a consistent set in which the projective decomposition t is repeated. Let S′ =
(ρ, {S1, t, T1, t, T2, t, S2}) be an extension of S by a further repetition of t at some point
between the first two, so that {T} = {T1, T2}. Then S′ is also consistent.
Put picturesquely, if a tree is observed standing in the forest at dusk and dawn, and if the
dynamics cause no qualitative complications, then the formalism allows us unambiguously
to deduce that it remained standing overnight while unobserved.
5. Example
A simple example illustrates the weaknesses of the consistency criterion. Consider two
systems, described by two-dimensional Hilbert spaces V and W , with orthonormal bases
{v1, v2} and {w1, w2}. We suppose that the total Hamiltonian is zero except between times
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t = t1 and t = t2, during which the systems are coupled by an interaction which models a
measurement process. Specifically, we take the unitary evolution operator between these
times to be the operator U defined by
U |v1〉|w1〉 = |v1〉|w1〉 , U |v2〉|w1〉 = |v2〉|w1〉 , U |v1〉|w2〉 = |v2〉|w2〉 , U |v2〉|w2〉 = −|v1〉|w2〉 ,
(5.1)
and we take ρi = |v1〉〈v1|⊗I. In this much simplified (and unrealistic) model, V represents
the relevant degrees of freedom — two “pointer positions” — of a measuring device exam-
ining a two-dimensional microscopic quantum system represented by W . We have chosen
ρi so that the initial pointer position is specified and no information is known about the
system W , which might for example be a spin-1/2 cosmic ray.
Now consider an experiment in which the pointer is observed to be in state |v1〉 at time
t3 > t2, so that the combined system lies in the range of the projection P = |v1〉〈v1| ⊗ I.
The standard description of this experiment would distinguish between the macroscopic
system V , which follows classical dynamics after t2 and the microscopic systemW , which is
observed at time t3 to be in the state |w1〉 and thereafter follows the Schro¨dinger equation.
Now the consistent histories description of the observation uses the set S defined by the
single projective decomposition {P, 1 − P} at time t3, and specifically the history from
that set defined by P .
However, none of the standard inferences drawn from the observation can be made
using the consistency criterion alone: we cannot deduce that the pointer was in state |v1〉
at times between t2 and t3 or after time t3 (as classical mechanics would imply), nor that
the system was in state |w1〉 after t3 (as standard quantum mechanics would imply). The
reason is that in each case we can find a consistent extension of S with which the inference
is inconsistent.
For example, let Q be the projection I⊗|w〉〈w| onto the state |w〉 = (|w1〉+ |w2〉)/
√
2
and R the projection I⊗|w1〉〈w1|. Then the set {{P, 1−P}(t3), {Q, 1−Q}(t)} is consistent.
(We now include explicit time labels and take t3 < t < t
′.) However, since the extended
set {{P, 1 − P}(t3), {Q, 1 − Q}(t), {R, 1 − R}(t′)} is inconsistent, we cannot infer that
the quantum mechanical system W is in state |w1〉 at any time t′ > t3. Essentially the
same argument shows that this inference cannot be made at time t3. In other words, the
observation of a pointer state does not imply the result of its measurement in the usual
way. Similar arguments show that we cannot infer that the pointer itself is in state |v1〉 at
any time other than t3.
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6. Conclusions
These results illustrate interesting features of the consistent histories formalism. Those
who prefer their fundamental theories to be mathematically precise will be encouraged that
the use of approximately consistent sets can apparently be avoided. On the other hand,
it will be seen that consistency itself is a very weak condition: there is generally a large
variety of consistent sets. We stress that this does not mean that the consistency crite-
rion is incompatible with experiment. Many careful studies have illustrated the efficiency
of the decoherence process and its crucial importance in understanding the dynamics of
quasiclassical systems.3 Assuming that quantum theory holds good as a description of
macroscopic systems, the moral to be drawn from these studies is that, in any realistic
description of an experiment, one of the consistent sets will correctly describe familiar
quasiclassical physics and will allow the standard predictions and inferences.
The problem here is that all consistent sets have the same status in the formalism,
most have very little to do with the quasiclassical world of our observations, and we can
only make the predictions we would like to make after we have made the choice of one
particular set: the familiar quasiclassical one. If the consistent histories formalism is to
represent an enhancement in predictive power over the Copenhagen interpretation it re-
quires interpretational arguments that show this choice to be determined by the formalism.
Omne`s’ interesting attempt[4,5] to find a mathematical criterion that correctly identifies
the relevant set, unfortunately, fails. The remaining arguments in the literature [6,7] which
suggest that the formalism nonetheless does explain the observed persistence of quasiclas-
sicality therefore deserve careful scrutiny. Our own conclusion [11] is that they rely on
important hidden assumptions.
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